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Abstract Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms,
with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the refer-
endum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the
initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger
in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the abolition of Switzerland’s direct democracy (at the federal
level) would—in the long-run—really lead to political decisions which are more
open to reforms.
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1 Introduction
Switzerland has the most extensive direct democratic system all over the world. All
levels, the local, the cantonal as well as the federal one, know the initiative and the
referendum. Any change of a constitution, be it the federal or a cantonal one, has to
be approved by the people. Moreover, the frequency of referenda is quite high.
Between 1981 and 2006, only at the federal level, there were 223 referenda and
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initiatives to decide on. Thus, there is no other country where the citizens can
participate to such an extent in political processes.
However, in the last 15 years, this system of direct popular rights, especially the
optional referendum, has quite often been accused of being an obstacle to reforms.1
In 1990, Borner et al. (p. 19) wrote:
The direct democracy which gives well organised interest groups the
permanent possibility to delay or even prevent a coherent strategy is, as
the core characteristic of our institutional system, the main reason for the
insufficient international orientation of Swiss politics. A real improvement of
the long-run adaptability, therefore, demands a modification of the direct
democratic instruments.
More recently, Borner wrote:
The decisive effect of the optional referendum is that this mechanism makes
any major change of the institutional framework more difficult for the
government and the parliament… In Switzerland, comprehensive political or
economic changes are exceptions.2
Even more pronounced is Wittmann (1998, p. 206f):3
… direct democracy quite generally and the referendum especially will—in
the long-run—ruin the Swiss economy because they impede market oriented
reforms. The direct democracy is on the way to endanger and destroy
Switzerland.
Consequently, he demands that direct popular rights should be cut back or even
totally abandoned
Switzerland has to debark from direct democracy and turn to a parliamentary
democracy, as it is in other countries. (Ibid., p. 233.)
The main argument of these authors is the bad economic performance of
Switzerland between 1990 and 2004; in these 15 years it had—on average—the
lowest economic growth rate of all OECD countries. The main reason for this bad
performance is seen in the lack of economic reforms which is due to the retarding
effect of the (optional) referendum.
There is no doubt that Switzerland did perform quite badly with respect to this
indicator during this period. Moreover, in the last decades, liberalisation of former
strongly regulated markets has gone much less far than in the European Union. This
holds, for example, for the electricity market or for postal services. On the other
hand, with respect to other economic indicators like GDP per capita, unemployment
or international competitiveness, the Swiss economy performs quite well. The Swiss
labour market, for example, is much less regulated than the ones of its neighbouring
1 There has also been criticism before, like by Imboden (1964) or German (1975).
2 Borner, Direkte Demokratie – letzter Schweizer Mythos, Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung No. 1 of January 3/4,
1997, pp. B9f.
3 See also Wittmann (2001).
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countries. This might also be an effect of direct democracy, and a major reason for
the low unemployment rate. Thus, the picture the Swiss economy presents today is
mixed, and positive as well as negative aspects of this picture might be related to the
Swiss political system.
Nevertheless, as will be shown below, there is a long list where the people have
rejected reform proposals, even if those had a large majority in both chambers of the
parliament. Thus, the referendum can increase the ‘status quo bias’ of political
systems.4 On the other hand, the initiative enables citizens to put issues on the
political agenda which might not (yet) be seen as being relevant by the political
representatives. Thus, be it for good or for bad: direct democratic instruments can
both retard and accelerate the political process.
Moreover, Switzerland is by far not the only country which is said to have a
‘reform-delay’ (Reformstau). Its large northern neighbouring country, Germany, for
example, suffers at least as deeply from this phenomenon as Switzerland, despite the
fact that it has a purely representative system at the federal level and—at least
compared to Switzerland or the United States—only rudimentary elements of direct
popular rights. Moreover, in 2004, Switzerland managed to pass a major reform of
its federal system. In Germany a first attempt for such a reform failed in December
2004, and only a small first step was realised in September 2006, leaving the really
pressing questions of the distribution of the finances between the federal and the
state levels open to a second round which is going on at the moment. However, even
rather optimistic observers do not believe that this reform will go very far. Thus,
despite the fact that due to its ‘joint decision trap’5 the demand for a reform is much
stronger, the whole package will together be much more limited than the Swiss
reform. Similar observations could be made with respect to the liberalisation of
labour markets. Thus, the available international—admittedly casual—evidence is
at least not unambiguous.
In the following, first the retardation effect of the referendum is discussed (Sect.
2). It is also considered why this status quo bias might be beneficial. Then we turn
to the accelerating effect of the initiative (Sect. 3). As the influence of interest
groups in the political system is often seen as the main reason why reforms are
delayed, in Sect. 4, we discuss this impact in direct and representative systems.
Finally, in Sect. 5, we discuss some of the possible changes which might result if
Switzerland were to abolish its direct democracy (at least at the federal level). It is
highly questionable whether such a change—in the long-run—really would lead to
‘better’ political decisions, and/or to decisions which would be more open to
reforms.
4 The status quo bias in personal decision making has first been demonstrated by Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988). Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that this bias can prevent political reforms, even if
they would be efficient from an economic point of view, when there would be more winner than losers,
and that this may occur even if neither risk aversion, nor irrationality, nor hysteresis due to sunk costs
play a role.
5 See for this Scharpf (1988).
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2 The retarding effect of the referendum
There is a long and rather impressive list of referenda which delayed reforms or
even rendered them impossible. Let us just consider a few rather prominent ones:6
• On February 1, 1959, the male voters rejected (for the last time) the women’s
right to vote. It was accepted 12 years later in the referendum of February 1,
1971.
• On March 2, 1975, an amendment to the constitution which should provide a
new basis for stabilisation policy (‘Konjunkturartikel’) was rejected. A modified
version was accepted on February 27, 1978.
• On December 5, 1976, the introduction of the 40 h working-week was rejected.
• On June 12, 1977, the switch from a sales to a value added tax was rejected. On
May 20, 1979, it was rejected once more. Finally, on November 28, 1993, it was
accepted.
• On December 6, 1992, the citizens rejected joining the European Economic Area
(EEA).
• On December 1, 1996, the revision of the labour law was rejected. A modified
version was accepted on November 29, 1998.
• On September 22, 2002, a new law (de-)regulating the electricity market was
rejected.
• On May 16, 2004, a major reform of the federal income tax was rejected.
These (and other) examples indicate that it can be difficult to introduce reforms in
a direct democratic system. However, as its neighbouring countries, Germany and
France, show, it might also be difficult to make reforms in purely parliamentary
systems. Direct democratic rights might be an impediment to reforms, but they are
certainly not the only ones. Not different from the situation in representative
systems, the last 10 years have shown that reforms are possible if there is some
economic pressure.7
Moreover, at least in some cases, the main reason for the delay was not that the
majority of the citizens was principally against a reform but that the parliament
made a ‘package-deal’: When the new labour law was to be decided on in 1996, the
parliament added a new regulation concerning business hours on Sundays to the
original proposal of the government. As the results of previous votes showed, this
new regulation did not find the support of a majority of voters. The second attempt
which skipped this addition and nearly went back to the regulation the government
had originally proposed, got a clear majority in 1998. In 2004, the—hardly
disputed—change in family taxation was combined with new subsidies for home
owners which not only were mostly at the expense of the cantons but had already
been rejected in a decision about an initiative five years earlier.
6 As indicated by the statements above, in the political discussion it is mostly the optional referendum
which is made responsible for the delay of reforms. However, in six of the eight examples mentioned
below it was a mandatory referendum. Thus, in this respect the mandatory is at least as important as the
optional referendum.
7 See for this also Gagales et al. (2005).
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The most interesting case is probably the change from the sales-tax to the value-
added tax. In first attempts, these changes were combined with a significant rise of
the tax rate. It is not astonishing that the citizens rejected to accept these proposals.
In March 1993, the package-deal was broken up and three separate decisions had to
be taken: (i) the change of the system, (ii) an increase of the tax rate from 6.2% to
6.5%, and an additional increase to 7.5% (to be introduced later) to get additional
revenue for the first column of the Swiss old age pension system, which is financed
by a pay-as-you-go system. The people accepted all three proposals. It can be taken
for granted that the proposals would have been rejected if they had again been
combined within a package. Nevertheless, as the referendum on the tax reform in
May 2004 shows, despite this evidence the parliamentarians again and again
succumb to the temptation to put a package-deal together in order to get something
through that the citizens do not want. In these cases, it is the parliamentary and not
the direct-democratic part of the political system which is responsible for the delay
of reforms.
There are, of course, other decisions where the voters (and nobody else) were
responsible for a delay. Thus, the referendum can aggravate the status quo bias.
However, at least as long as this bias is not too strong, it remains open how it should
be evaluated. A rejection of a reform can be advantageous in the long-run, if the
reform would go into the ‘wrong’ direction. From the perspective of economic
liberalism, this might hold for several of the examples mentioned above, for
example for the rejection of the 40-h working-week and probably also for the
rejection of the first version of the Konjunkturartikel. On the other hand, the
rejection of joining the European Economic Area was certainly an impediment for
Switzerland’s economic development. And the results are also ambivalent from a
political perspective. During the seventies, when social-democratic concerns like
the 40-h working-week were rejected, the bourgeois parties benefited from using the
direct instruments, as the general public gave more credit to their arguments than the
parliament. In the nineties, the opposite situation seemed to exist: The left political
side could successfully use the referendum for preventing—at least partly—
unwanted reforms. Thus, in different situations the status quo bias helps different
political parties or interest groups.
This indicates what—in principle—should be self-evident: the quality of a direct
democratic system should not be evaluated on the basis of single, selected decisions
or on the current constellation of interests, which might change in the future, but on
the expected average quality of all political decisions under different constellations
together. As the list above shows, there are examples where referenda prevented
decisions which might have been beneficial for Switzerland in the long-run.
However, there are also examples of opposite situations. Taking examples can only
indicate what can be the case, but this is not sufficient for proving systematic
relationships. It can (and does) indicate that both systems have advantages and
disadvantages. To reveal which is the better one (and in which respect) demands
systematic empirical analyses. The available studies show that at least the economic
performance of direct democratic systems is not worse than the one of purely
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representative systems; the results indicate that it is rather better.8 Thus, even if
there is a delay of reforms, it does not seem to create major economic problems in
the long-run.
Nevertheless, due to the referendum, the status quo has at least some advantage
compared to new political proposals in the Swiss direct democracy. Insofar, the
critics of the direct democracy are right. But it also has to be asked whether such a
status quo bias does make sense. Stability of a political system is usually
acknowledged as being an advantage. It generates reliability for the plans of private
agents which is often said to be a precondition for economic prosperity.9 Of course,
a system can also be too stable and, therefore, miss necessary innovations.
Nevertheless, at least with respect to the mandatory referendum that is relevant for
constitutional changes it should be uncontroversial that—ceteris paribus—stability
should be an advantage. It is not for nothing that most constitutions demand high
quorums for constitutional changes; in bi-cameral purely representative systems it is
usually a two third-majority in both chambers. Insofar, one might even argue that
the Swiss constitutional status quo is not protected enough, because—given a
certain distribution between the cantons—a simple majority of the population is
sufficient to change the constitution.
The final question in this respect is whether a reform should be performed at all if
the majority of citizens votes against it. The assumption behind such a consideration
(and also behind most of the statements which complain about Switzerland’s reform
deficit) is that the political representatives (and/or some other elites) know better
what is good for the society and for the citizens than the latter themselves. In a
democracy, such a position is at least not without problems. Taking the (pure) theory
of democracy, the median voter should be decisive in a democratic system. There is
clear evidence that the outcome of direct democratic systems is closer to the median
voter’s decision than the outcome of a purely representative system.10 Insofar, the
retarding effect of the referendum does at least not seem to be too damaging.
3 The accelerating effect of the initiative
When discussing the reform ability of the Swiss system of direct democracy, it is
not sufficient to consider only the referendum; the initiative has also to be taken into
account. While the referendum is the brake, the initiative is the gas pedal of the
direct democracy.11 This is obvious for the United States, where the tax revolts
which started with initiatives, especially proposition 13 in California, induced a
political change, but it holds for Switzerland as well. And as the following two
examples show, such an effect can take place even if the initiative is officially not
successful, i.e. if it is rejected by a majority of voters.
8 See, for example, Feld and Savioz (1997) or Freitag und Vatter (2000) for Switzerland as well as
Blomberg et al. (2004) for the United States.
9 For a formal analysis of the stability of the Swiss political system see Moser (1996, 1996a).
10 See, for example, Pommerehne (1978) and Gerber (1996, 1999).
11 See for this Eichenberger (1999).
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(i) Despite (or even because of) its direct democratic system Switzerland, had in
the recent decades (and still has somewhat) a reputation for being a forerunner
in environmental policy. Already on February 18, 1979, Swiss citizens were
able to vote about phasing out of nuclear energy. The corresponding initiative
was rejected by the people with only a small margin, but it induced a public
discourse on the risks of atomic energy which took place much later (if at all)
in other European countries like Germany, Austria or France. Because at
that time all major parties and interest groups were still in favour of this
energy source, there was, for example, no corresponding discourse in
Germany.
(ii) On November 26, 1989, people decided whether the Swiss army should be
abolished. Before the decision there was an intense and sometimes rather
heated public discussion. It is well known that the Swiss army is (or was at
least at that time) a ‘sacred cow’. Besides the Social Democrats and the trade
unions, who both did not give any recommendation, all relevant political
parties and interest groups as well as both chambers of the national parliament
recommended that this initiative should be rejected. Given this closed position
of the whole political establishment and given the traditional commitment of
the Swiss population to their army, it was generally expected that only a very
small part of the electorate would vote for the initiative; even a 10% approval
seemed to be high. The result was, however, quite different: 35.6% voted for
the abolition of the army, and the turnout of 69.2% was exceptionally high.
This unexpected result changed the political situation and, soon after the
referendum, alleviations for those who deny the service in the army have been
introduced, like an alternative civilian service.
These two examples show that a direct democratic political system can better
take up impulses from outside the political system than a purely parliamentary
system. At the Swiss federal level, only the signatures of about 2% of the electorate
are necessary to start an initiative. Thus, people who do not belong to the ‘classe
politique’ have a relatively cheap but official way to bring their interest into the
political discourse. The same is much more difficult in a purely parliamentary
system, as, firstly, citizens’ groups have to be organised, and secondly, these groups
have to convince parties to take up their ideas (or even have to found new parties).
And as the second example shows, an initiative might be successful in changing
politics even in a situation where a priori chances for such a change seem to be
rather small.
There is, however, evidence that the retarding effect of the referendum might—
on average—be stronger than the accelerating effect of the initiative. The reason for
this is that it is easier to mobilise against an issue than in favour of it. Considering
the period between 1981 and 1999, Kirchga¨ssner and Schulz (2005) as well as
Kirchga¨ssner (2007) showed that mobilisation expenditure against a proposition are
about twice as effective than those in favour of the decision: One Swiss Franc spent
in a campaign for No-votes has about the double effect compared with a Franc spent
in the Yes-campaign. This is in line with earlier results for Switzerland and the
United States according to which financially strong interest groups can rather
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prevent the acceptance of a proposal by the citizens than get their own proposals
approved.12
4 The role of interest groups and distributional coalitions
As the statements above show, the leeway which direct democracy provides interest
groups is seen as the main reason for the lack of reforms: firstly, the threat of a
referendum gives even small interest groups the possibility to gain influence in the
legislative process, and secondly, if they are not successful in a first round, they can
actually start a referendum in order to prevent the proposed law to come into effect.
The question is, however, whether interest groups are really more successful in a
(semi-) direct democracy than in a purely parliamentary system. Their major impact
on the legislative process is probably neither the impact they have on the public
discussion when a law is in the legislative procedure nor the impact they have on the
voters’ decisions, but their hardly visible and non-transparent influences first on the
bureaucracy in the pre-parliamentary stage and second in the parliamentary
committees where representatives of these interest groups can directly influence the
new law. This influence might be restricted if the final decision might be at the polls.
Thus, the stronger impact interest groups have on the direct-democratic political
process via influencing the popular vote might at least partly be outweighed by the
restricted impact in the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary stages of the legislative
process. The fact, that the impact of interest groups is more open and more visible
does not imply that it is really larger. Somewhat simplified: It might be easier (and
cheaper) to buy the votes of the majority of the parliamentarians (or even only of the
responsible parliamentary committee) than those of a majority of voters.
There are examples where the voters decided against the recommendations of
many important (and financially strong) interest groups. Some of the examples
mentioned above, like the decisions about joining the EEA in 1992 or about the tax
reform in 2004 belong to this group. But there are also examples where the people
voted in a referendum or even in an initiative in favour of a proposal despite the fact
that influential interest groups spent a lot of money to prevent this. The most
prominent example might be the acceptance of the Alpine Initiative (Alpeninitia-
tive) in February 1994 against the recommendations of the vast majority of political
parties and interest groups. This also holds, for example, for the introduction of a
special charge on commercial traffic (Leistungsabha¨ngige Schwerverkehrsabgabe
(LSVA)) in September 1998 which was opposed not only by the association of lorry
owners but also by the Swiss Peoples Party, which today is—measured by the votes
to the Lower Chamber, the ‘Nationalrat’—the strongest Swiss party. This right-wing
party, together with its associated civil movement, the ‘Campaign for an
Independent and Neutral Switzerland’ (Aktion fu¨r eine unabha¨ngige und neutrale
Schweiz, AUNS) organised quite a lot of referenda in the last 15 years, and won
12 See, for example, Hertig (1982), Gruner and Hertig (1983) as well as Longchamp (1991) for
Switzerland, or Gerber (1999) for the United States. For a survey of other studies see Kirchga¨ssner et al.
(1999, pp. 27ff).
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some, but lost most of them, important as well as less important ones. Thus, despite
the empirical evidence mentioned above, it is not as easy to defeat a bill as is often
assumed.
Whether Swiss interest groups are more or less influential than those in other
countries, is finally an open empirical question. At the moment, there is no study
available which allows an answer, and it is far from obvious how their impact could
be measured in an international comparable way, to give a definite answer on
this question. Nevertheless, Borner et al. (1994, pp. 26f) argue that the threat of a
referendum gives even small interest groups particular possibilities for rent-seeking
activities. The available indirect empirical evidence is, however, not in line with this
supposition. With respect to economic freedom, in 2007 Switzerland had rank nine
of the 161 countries considered, together with New Zealand, the United Kingdom
and the United States and with a rating of 79.1.13 Thus, at least compared to other
countries, there does not seem to be a major negative impact of Swiss politics on the
economic system. Moreover, in an international comparative study, Katz and
Rosenberg (1989) ask for the social waste caused by rent-seeking. They conclude
that Switzerland has the smallest waste of all 20 countries considered, it is only
0.19% of GNP. Even if there has been some criticism of this study, the available
evidence does at least not suggest that the waste from rent-seeking is particularly
high in Switzerland.14
This is, of course, not surprising. Following Olson (1982), the sclerosis (and,
correspondingly, the reform-delay) of democratic nations results from the rent-
seeking activities of ‘distributional coalitions’ of interest groups. Their influence
goes via the parliamentary process. Every single group is too small to get a majority
in the parliament, but by combining the votes of many groups, i.e. by logrolling, this
might be possible. This kind of ‘pork-barrel politics’ is possible due to the effect of
fiscal illusion: the benefits are concentrated, while the costs of every single measure
are so dispersed that they are hardly noticeable for the single voter. Thus, voters
support their local candidates and/or the candidates of their parties, if those are
active in helping to promote their special (geographic or group) interests. The whole
situation is the one of a social dilemma: All voters would be better off if none of
these special interests would be satisfied, but it is even better for them if their own
special interests are satisfied but not the other ones. Thus, from behaviour which is
rational from an individual point of view a socially suboptimal outcome emerges.
The strength of these interest groups increases the longer a stable democratic
system exists. Switzerland, a stable democracy since 1848, should, therefore, have
very strong distributional coalitions. Such logrolling is, however, extremely difficult
in a direct democracy. Firstly and most importantly, binding contracts which can be
agreed among parliamentarians are impossible among (many) citizens. Thus, the
only way for logrolling contracts are package-deals. This severely restricts the
extent of logrolling. Secondly, as mentioned above, Swiss voters are extremely
sceptical with respect to package-deals; they usually reject them, even if they would
13 See http://www.heritage.org/index/countries.cfm (19/10/07).
14 See the discussion between Schnytzer (1994) and Katz and Rosenberg (1994). For a similar conclusion
with respect to the United States see Matsusaka (2004, p. 3).
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accept some (or perhaps all) of their elements. Finally, with respect to pork-barrel
politics, it is hardly possible to get a majority of the single elements of the package-
deals, just because the benefits are concentrated. Thus, logrolling is much more
difficult in a direct democracy than in a purely representative system. Correspond-
ingly, the waste from rent-seeking activities should also be smaller.
As far as reforms are necessary to counteract the results of rent-seeking activities
of small interest groups, such reforms should, therefore, be less necessary in a direct
democracy. An example might be the fact that the Swiss labour market is much less
regulated than the ones of its neighbouring countries. Consequently, deregulation of
the labour market is much less a topic in Switzerland than, for example, in Germany
or France.15 But having—ceteris paribus—less need for reforms does not imply that
reforms, once they are necessary, are also easier to put through. The fact that it is
easier to mobilise against a change than in favour of it speaks for the opposite. Thus,
interest groups might be especially strong in a direct democracy to defend their
special privileges.
In defending their privileges, they can be, however, also very strong in a purely
representative system. In order not to lose the next election, democratic
governments sometimes satisfy the demands even of small interest groups (or
parts of the population). The best example of this are the farmers.16 They are rather
strong in Switzerland, despite the fact that with less than 4% of the labour force they
are today only a very small part of the population. They are, however, also very
powerful in France or the United States, which—at the federal level—do not have
direct political rights comparable to Switzerland.17 Thus, that some even small
interest groups are rather influential is not specific to the Swiss political system; it is
rather a general phenomenon.
5 Concluding remarks
Given the empirical evidence, it would be naive to deny that, due to the refe-
rendum, the Swiss direct democracy has a build-in status quo bias. The accelerating
effect of the initiative can counteract this to some extent, but it cannot balance it
totally. This holds even if it is taken into account that the impact of interest groups
in the Swiss political system is hardly larger, probably even smaller, than in other
democratic political system. This conservative bias certainly makes sense if basic,
constitutional political decisions are considered. Probably all democratic societies
have safeguards against easy changes of their constitution; usually a two-third
majority (in federal countries of both houses) is demanded. Contrary to this, the
Swiss constitution can easily be changed, demanding only a majority of the people
and the cantons. And it is, indeed, changed quite often. It is less clear whether this
15 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, some deregulation took place with the revision of the labour law
that has been accepted in 1998.
16 Another example is the strong impact the National Rifle Association has on US politics. Its influence
in the current US system is probably much larger than it would be in a system with referenda and
initiatives. See for this, for example, Kirchga¨ssner et al. (1999, p. 31).
17 France does not even have direct popular rights at the lower governmental levels.
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bias makes sense with respect to statutory laws. One might argue that with respect to
such decisions the new proposal should—ex ante—have equal chances as the status
quo.
From a democratic point of view, the question should, however, not be whether
new proposals have equal chances as the status quo, but which system does lead to
solutions that are closer to the preferences of the citizens (or of the median voter,
respectively). In this respect the evidence is clear: the direct democratic system has
a clear advantage. Thus, even if there were a reform-delay in comparison to other
democratic political systems, from the point of the theory of democracy, these might
be costs which have to be borne to come closer to the citizens’ preferences. But
considering the economic performance, it is far from clear that these are—on
average—really costs. The available empirical literature tells us rather the opposite.
But as this evidence—necessarily—relates to sub-federal levels, US states or Swiss
cantons, it remains open how far this also relates to the federal level. There are good
arguments in favour of this position, but one can also question it.18
But what would happen if Switzerland were to abolish its direct democracy, at
least at the federal level? Given the political status quo, this would lead to quite
different political decisions. Not only would all the decisions mentioned in Sect. 2
have been accepted; without the threat of a referendum the pendulum would, with
respect to economic decisions, swing to the right but with respect to others possibly
to the left: We would have a more liberalised electricity market, for example, and
also more liberal naturalisation laws.
But this is only part of the story. As our neighbouring representative democracies
show, we would probably have much more regulation, and we might have severe
difficulties in deregulating. Moreover, it is naive to assume that the political status
quo would last forever. The bourgeois politicians and firm leaders who want to
restrict direct popular rights might find themselves in opposition to a left-wing
dominated government and a corresponding parliament after some time, and this
might even be less in favour of the reforms they demand than today’s parliament.
Political competition in a purely representative system demands changes of the
ruling parties from time to time. Consequently, people favouring economic
liberalism (and complaining about a reform-delay) might be faced with a situation
which is much less in favour of their interests than the current one. Thus, it is totally
open whether an abolition of direct democratic rights at the federal level would
really make Switzerland more open to reforms.
This is, of course, pure speculation. The Swiss population will hardly ever accept
such a change of their political system, definitely not today and not in the near and
medium-run future. Thus, we have to live with the current situation. And this is not
as bad as some people want us to believe. While some reforms have been blocked,
there have been even some major reforms in Switzerland in recent years, and there
are others to come. As Weber (1919, p. 251f) told us, politics is the drilling of thick
boards. The boards might be a little bit thicker in a direct democracy, but there
might also be fewer holes necessary to be drilled. Those who complain about
18 See, for this discussion Kirchga¨ssner et al. (1999, pp. 105ff). This position is questioned, for example,
by Wittmann (2001, pp. 31f).
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missing reforms in the Swiss democracy are at least sometimes citizens who are
convinced that their special interests would be better served in a system which did
not allow the other citizens to prevent this.19 But this would not necessarily be an
advantage for the whole Swiss society.
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